This paper analyzes transitions into and out of 3 different labor market states, social assistance, unemployment and employment. We estimate a dynamic multinomial logit model, controlling for endogenous initial condition and unobserved heterogeneity, using a large representative Swedish panel data set, LINDA, for the years 1990 to 1996. The unadjusted data indicates that immigrants are more likely to receive both social assistance and unemployment compensation than natives. Immigrants are less likely to remain employed in consecutive years than natives and are more likely to stay on welfare and to receive unemployment insurance in a year, given participation in the previous year. The empirical results suggest that particularly refugee immigrants display a greater degree of "structural" state dependence than natives. The high welfare participation rates among refugee immigrants seem to be due to the existence of a "welfare trap", while participation among natives and non-refugee immigrants is largely due to permanent unobserved characteristics. These results suggest that welfare reforms will have differential effects on refugee immigrants and natives.
Introduction
The increase in immigration experienced by many Western countries in the last decade has led to raised concerns regarding immigrant over utilization in welfare programs. In fact, this concern has incited some countries to restrict access to some government transfer programs for immigrants. In the U.S. for example, The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, denies non-citizens who arrived after 1996 the right to receive most types of public assistance.
In Germany, immigrants without permanent residency may lose the right to stay in the country or may be denied residency extensions if they depend on social assistance.
Although the country studied in this paper, Sweden, does not treat immigrants differently from natives with respect to social assistance, immigration is central to the welfare debate. According to the National Board of Health and Welfare, by the mid-1990's immigrants in Sweden accounted for nearly half of the country's expenditure on social assistance, up from less than one quarter of total expenditures in the early 1980's. This is quite remarkable since immigrants represent approximately an 11 percent minority of the population. In addition, given that real expenditures on the social assistance program in Sweden increased by 170 percent between 1983 and 1996 and that the share of immigrants in the population during the same period increased from 7.6 percent to 10.8 percent, it is clear that understanding immigrants' welfare utilization is essential in explaining the expenditure trend.
One important reason for the increase in welfare participation, and the consequent growth in expenditures, is the rise in the unemployment rate in the 1990's in Sweden. Figure 1 shows the official unemployment rate reported by Statistics Sweden for the labor force and for foreign citizens. The unemployment rate grew from 1.7 percent in 1990 to slightly more than 8 percent in 1996. For immigrants, the labor market deteriorated even more. In 1990, approximately 4 percent of foreign citizens were unemployed. This had increased to 23 percent by 1996. The increase in welfare expenditures in Sweden in the 1990's can partly be explained by the large inflows of immigrants who arrived during this period who were not eligible for unemployment insurance and therefore had to rely on social assistance for their subsistence.
The poor immigrant employment situation in the last decade is not specific to Sweden. Immigrants in most European OECD countries experience substantially higher unemployment rates relative to natives (SOPEMI 2000) . Furthermore, like Sweden, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom received large numbers of asylum seekers during the 1990s. The inflow of new refugee immigrants is likely to have put an increased pressure on immigrant public assistance expenditure and increasing efforts have been taken to integrate immigrants effectively into the respective labor markets (SOPEMI 2000) .
Several studies have examined differences in welfare participation between immigrants and natives (see for instance Baker and Benjamin, 1995; Borjas and Hilton, 1996; Lofstrom, 2003 and Riphahn, 2004 for Canada, the U.S., Sweden and Germany respectively). However, to our knowledge, no study has analyzed transitions across labor market states of immigrants, mainly due to a lack of representative panel data with sufficiently large number of immigrants. Understanding the dynamic processes underlying the observed utilization of government transfer programs is essential.
Questions regarding an existence of a "welfare trap" and if it matters differently for immigrants and natives are important policy issues. If, for example, observed serial persistence in welfare utilization is due to permanent unobserved heterogeneity, e.g. individuals have time invariant unobserved preferences for welfare participation, the observed dependence is "spurious" and policies directed at getting people off welfare are less likely to be successful. On the other hand, if the persistence is due to "structural" dependence, in the sense that previous participation directly affects current probability of participation, i.e. a "welfare trap" exists, changes in benefit rules are more likely to meet their objectives of utilization reduction. It is also possible that there exist differences in state dependence of transfer program participation between immigrants and natives. This paper aims to investigate this possibility and, if differences exist, to quantify the differences.
In this paper we confine the analysis to transitions into and out of three states:
welfare, unemployment and employment.
1 Our goal is to answer the following questions:
Do the probabilities of transitions differ between natives and immigrants? Is there a "welfare trap" in Sweden and, if so, is this state dependence different for immigrants and natives?
To answer these questions we estimate dynamic multinomial logit models, controlling for both endogenous initial condition and unobserved heterogeneity, taking advantage of a recently collected large representative longitudinal data set, Longitudinal
Individual Data (LINDA). This data set contains information on more than 300,000 individuals annually for the period 1990 to 1996. The data is collected from administrative records which imply essentially no attrition and equally important, accurately reported welfare status.
The data show that immigrants are less likely to remain employed in consecutive years than natives and are more likely to stay on welfare, or to receive unemployment insurance, given participation in the previous year. The empirical results suggest that refugee immigrants display a greater degree of "structural" state dependence in welfare than natives and immigrants from non-refugee countries. Further, immigrants from nonrefugee countries also display a large degree of "structural" unemployment state dependence. Overall, the source of state dependence is found to be more spurious among natives than immigrants. This indicate that the high welfare participation rates among refugee immigrants, in particular, is due to the existence of a "welfare trap", while participation among natives and non-refugee immigrants is largely due to permanent unobserved characteristics. Furthermore, the results imply that changes in welfare program parameters will have differential effects on refugee immigrants and natives and that the success of, for example, labor market training programs will differ across groups.
The paper is organized in the following way. In section 2 we give background information about immigration, the social assistance program and unemployment insurance in Sweden. Section 3 describes the data and variables while Section 4 depicts trends and differences, between immigrants and natives, in government transfer program participation and transitions. In Section 5 we provide a discussion of state dependence and in Section 6 we present the model and empirical specification. We discuss the results in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8.
Immigration and Welfare Programs in Sweden

Immigration into Sweden
The inflow of immigrants to Sweden has undergone a number of changes during the last six decades. Figure 2 shows annual immigration to Sweden from 1940 to 1998, both in terms of the level of the immigrant inflow and inflow expressed as the proportion of the total population in the corresponding year. Overall, annual immigration has amounted to about 0.4 percent of the population, but notably higher during the 1990's.
Naturally, the large inflow of immigrants has also changed the composition of the population in Sweden. 
Social Assistance in Sweden
The Swedish welfare system is well known internationally for the high degree of income security that it provides for its citizens. Recently, this generous system has been the target of a number of reforms, mainly due to the recession that hit Sweden, and many other countries, in the early 1990's.
As an ultimate safety net, people in Sweden are covered by social assistance (SA).
As with unemployment insurance, the eligibility rules and benefit levels are the same for immigrants and natives. In order to be eligible for SA, all other welfare programs, such as unemployment compensation, housing allowance (bostadsbidrag), child allowance (barnbidrag), maintenance allowance (underhållsbidrag) and various pensions, must be exhausted first. The benefit levels vary, both across family types and regions, but are intended to cover expenses essential for a "decent" standard of living. To be eligible for SA benefits, a family must have income and assets below certain specified benefits levels, known as norms. The norms were, until 1998, determined in each of the 288 municipalities in Sweden. However, as of the 1 st of January 1998, the regional variations in the norms were replaced by a national norm in order to reduce the inequality aspect of having differentiated benefit levels. 2 The norms serve as guidelines for the social worker who decides the actual size of the benefits. SA benefits are paid according to a schedule that sets a guarantee amount for a family of a given size. These benefits are reduced at a 100 percent reduction rate as the family's income rises.
Unemployment Insurance in Sweden
The Swedish unemployment insurance system consists of two parts: unemployment benefits (Arbetslöshetskassa, UB) and unemployment assistance (Kontant arbetsmarknadsstöd, UA). In 1990, the coverage was slightly less than 80 percent of the labor force, with roughly 70 percent covered by UB and 10 percent by UA. To be entitled to compensation from UB, an unemployed worker must have paid membership fees to the UB fund for the last 12 months and he must have been working for at least 75 days preceding the current unemployment spell. These conditions imply that many of the new entrants in the labor market, such as young workers and immigrants, are not entitled to compensation from UB. There is a time limit on UB and entitled workers can receive benefits for a maximum of 300 working days. Compared to non-Scandinavian countries, the benefit levels are quite generous with replacement rates varying between 75 and 90 percent during the 1990's.
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Workers who are not eligible for receiving UB may be entitled to compensation from UA. There exists a similar work requirement for receiving UA as for receiving UB, but there is no "membership" requirement. However, UA is substantially less generous than UB, both in terms of benefit duration and compensation levels. 4 The fact that workers have the choice to pay and participate in the more generous UB program while there is only a work requirement, and no fee, involved in becoming eligible for UA compensation suggests that, plausibly, participants in these separate programs are likely to differ in their expectations of future labor market outcomes. In our analysis below, we do not distinguish between individuals who receive compensation from UA or AB. It should be noted, however, that transitions across labor market states may differ depending on which program the person is eligible to receive compensation from and that state dependence may also differ across the programs.
Data
Description of the Data and Sampling Procedures
The data used in this paper is taken from a recently created Swedish longitudinal data set, Longitudinal Individual Data (LINDA). LINDA is a register-based data set and it consists of a large panel of individuals, and their household members, which are representative for the population from 1960 to 1996. LINDA is a joint endeavor between the Department of Economics at Uppsala University, The National Social Insurance Board (RFV), Statistics Sweden, and the Ministries of Finance and Labor. The main administrator of the data set is Statistics Sweden. For a more detailed description of the data used here, including the sampling structure, see Edin and Fredriksson (2000) .
assistance for housing is also available, known as "bostadsbidrag". In 1998, the exchange rate was roughly 8 SEK per U.S. Dollar. 3 Until 1993, the UB replacement rate was 90 percent of earnings up to a maximum level determined by the government. In July 1993, the replacement rate was reduced to 80 percent and in January 1996, it was further reduced to 75 percent. 
Variable Definitions
To answer the questions regarding the existence of a "welfare trap" in Sweden,
we estimate a dynamic multinomial model controlling for both unobserved individual heterogeneity and initial conditions. We distinguish between three mutually exclusive labor market states for every year: being employed, receiving unemployment benefits and receiving social assistance.
Since LINDA lacks information about individuals' time allocation, we need to rely on the income sources to classify individuals into different labor market states.
Furthermore, an objective of our analysis is to capture any utilization of welfare. Hence, we define three labor market states as follows. Firstly, if the individual received welfare during at least one month during the year, we define the person to be a welfare recipient in that year. Individuals who did not receive welfare, in the given year, but received more than one-half of a "basic amount", 18,100 in 1996 Swedish kronor (roughly $2,500 using current exchange rates), in unemployment benefits during the year, were defined as being unemployed. 9 Individuals who were not defined as welfare recipients or unemployed and earned more than the "basic amount", 36,200 Swedish kronor in income from employment (approximately $5,000), were defined as being employed that year.
10,11
8 The possibility of non-random return migration is another reason to define the immigrant sample in this way. find that that return migration among refugees is low, less than 10 percent within 5 years since arrival, and if an immigrant is to leave Sweden, it is most likely to take place within the first few years after arrival. By excluding the most recent immigrants we may decrease the potential effects of return migration on our estimates. We also find it comforting that the results do not change very much between the samples with and without the years since migration restriction. 9 If the person is participating in a active labor market program, which may include training, and receives unemployment compensation of more that 18,100 Swedish kronor, and did not receive income from SA, he is defined to be unemployed in the given year. Note that our definition of unemployment differs from the official definition used by Statistics Sweden. Nonetheless, for simplicity we refer to unemployment in this paper utilizing the above definition. Lastly, we are not able to distinguish between unemployment compensation from UA or UB. 10 The seemingly arbitrary value of annual earnings chosen to indicate employment, 36,200 SEK, refers to the so called "basic amount". Statistics Sweden defines individuals as employed during a year if they earned this amount.
Given that our income information is specified for the year, it is possible that an individual can receive income from two, or even all of the three, sources defined above during a year. Note that if the individual received any income from social assistance, the individual is defined to be a welfare recipient. 12 Our rationale for this approach is that we want to capture any reliance on social assistance. Nonetheless, we perform sensitivity analysis of the labor market state definitions in the empirical results section below.
Another issue is that although unemployment and employment are individual states, welfare receipt is a household state and depends on family composition and family income. That is, an individual may move in and out-of welfare depending on the labor market behavior of a spouse, or changes in the household composition. We try to address the latter issue by including controls for household composition, specifically marital status and number of children. Arguably, sensitivity in welfare receipt due to changes in employment/unemployment outcome of the spouse is greater for women than men, the latter being the group analyzed in this paper. We also note that the results of Hansen and Lofstrom (2006) , whose analysis is restricted to social assistance entry and exit, are consistent with the results presented below.
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Previous research has found greater sensitivity in public assistance participation to local labor market conditions among immigrants than natives in the U.S. (Lofstrom and Bean, 2002) . To address this issue, local labor market variables are assigned to each individual in each year based on the individual's region of residence. The information is obtained from three sources. Data on average county earnings growth are obtained using LINDA while data on local unemployment rates, at the county level, were acquired from Statistics Sweden's labor force surveys. To address any long-term effects of the economic conditions when joining the labor force, we incorporate annual growth in gross domestic product and the annual unemployment rate at time of labor market entry. For 11 Since we need to rely on the income sources to classify individuals into different labor market states, in any given year, approximately three percent of our sample does not satisfy the criteria for the above three states. These individuals appear to be predominantly students living with family, individuals on disability or early retirement. We have excluded this group in the subsequent analysis. 12 Note that the data does not allow us to distinguish when during the year the person received income from a particular source. It is hence possible that someone can be defined to be unemployed directly following a year when the person was defined to be on welfare, despite both UA's and UB's work requirements. 13 It should also be noted that the labor supply decision of one spouse is likely to depend on the labor supply decision of the other spouse. Hence, both the employment and unemployment states may be considered as household states and not individual states.
immigrants, year of labor market entry is identical to time of arrival in Sweden, while we use years of education plus seven to define the age when a native enters the labor market.
The data is obtained from Statistics Sweden.
The Swedish municipalities provide data on social assistance benefit guidelines, also known as norms. The municipality, in which the individual resides, as well as the family composition, such as marital status, age and number of children determines the norms, which establishes the benefit level. We were able to assign a social assistance norm to each person in the sample in 1994 and in 1996. Unfortunately, we have not been able to obtain similar information for the other years. Nevertheless, the municipal generosity rankings between the two years appear constant, indicating stability across municipality benefit levels over time. To resolve the missing municipal information issue, we assign the 1994 norms to all years prior to 1995 and the 1996 norms to the years 1995 and 1996.
Welfare and Labor Market Behavior
Sweden experienced an increase in immigration in the 1990's. During this period the economy was also entrenched in a severe recession, with a trough around 1993-94 which only moderately leveled off by 1996. Table 1 shows welfare participation rates, as well as our measures for unemployment and employment rates, separately by year for the four groups; natives, Nordic immigrants, non-refugee immigrants and refugee immigrants.
Immigrants participated to a greater extent in both the social assistance and unemployment compensation programs than natives did throughout the period studied here. Furthermore, Nordic and other non-refugee immigrants utilized these programs less than refugees. The table also shows that there is a greater difference between immigrant and native welfare utilization than in the immigrant-native difference in participation in the unemployment insurance programs. The discrepancy in the relative utilization rates in the programs between immigrants and natives is at least partially due to UI ineligibility for, in particular recent, refugee immigrants.
There are substantial differences in the dynamic welfare and labor market behavior between immigrants and natives. Table 2 shows transition probability matrices separately for the four groups. This table reveals several interesting relationships and patterns. First, we examine the issue of state dependence in the raw data. For all four groups, the most stable state is employment. However, employment is less stable for immigrants, especially refugee immigrants, than it is for natives. The probability a native stays employed for two consecutive years is 0.94 while the corresponding probability is 0.86 for immigrants from refugee countries. Welfare also appears to be a relatively stable state for this immigrant group. The probability of remaining in welfare the next is approximately 0.79. There are only small differences between the four groups in the probabilities of collecting UI in consecutive years, between 0.71 and 0.73.
Table 2 also indicates that immigrants are considerably less likely to move out-of welfare and into employment than natives. An immigrant from a refugee country is on average almost less than half as likely to move off welfare and into employment compared to a native born Swede, probabilities of 0.19 and 0.1 respectively. All groups are more likely to move into employment from unemployment than welfare. However, the differences in the unemployment to employment transition probabilities between immigrants and natives are less than the immigrant-native differences in transition probabilities between welfare and employment.
Conditional on being employed in a given year, it also appears that immigrants are more likely to collect either welfare or UI than natives are in the next year. Table 2 shows that about 1 percent of natives move from employment to welfare in consecutive years. The equivalent transition probability for refugee immigrants is close to 0.05, while it is around 0.03 for both non-refugee and Nordic immigrants. All immigrant groups are also more likely to move from employment to unemployment than natives.
Approximately 5 percent of natives go from employment to unemployment in a given year while roughly 6 percent of the immigrants from non-refugee and the Nordic countries experience the same transition. Among refugees, slightly less than 10 percent collect UI the year after being employed.
Given the differences in transition probabilities between immigrants and natives, we would also expect the distribution of the number of welfare and labor market spells to differ across groups. Table 3 shows the distribution of these spells for the balanced panel, a sub-sample consisting of men who were observed for the whole period 1990-96. 14 This means that the figures shown in Table 3 general, it appears that any movements out of welfare into employment are associated with higher educational attainment, being married and having more children. Individuals who move from welfare to employment also seem to live in areas with relatively low unemployment and, surprisingly, a relatively strong decline in earnings growth as well as higher benefit levels. Transitions from unemployment into employment are associated with higher education, being married and having more children. Unlike transitions from welfare to employment, moving from unemployment to employment is positively correlated with economic growth in the county. Regarding transitions from employment to welfare, it appears to be associated with lower levels of schooling, being single, having more children and living in a major city. The only general relationship for state dependency appears to be age, namely, older individuals seem to be less likely to move out of previous year's state.
Some of the above discussed differences between immigrants and natives may be due to differences in schooling levels, age, marital status, family composition, geographic location, economic growth and unemployment rate at time of labor market entry, differences in benefit levels and differences in the local labor market conditions. We next discuss potential sources of the observed state dependence and then we present an empirical model that takes the above observable characteristics into account, as well as unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions.
State Dependence: Structural v. Spurious
The empirical strategy utilized in this paper allows us to estimate to what extent the observed state dependence is "structural" and "spurious". However, before empirically analyzing the data, we address what the potential sources are for the different types of serial persistence. The goal of this section is to first define the forms of state dependence and to examine alternative sources of structural and spurious serial persistence respectively. Policy implications of the form of state dependence are discussed in the results section below.
Economists have often observed that individuals who were employed, unemployed or collected social assistance in the previous period are more likely to be observed in those particular event states in the future than persons who did not experience those specific events (e.g. Blank, 1989; Chay and Hyslop, 1998; Engberg, Gottschalk and Wolf, 1990; Hyslop, 1999) . The source of this observed serial persistence is not clear and may be due to two distinctive explanations. Following Heckman (1981) , we define the state dependence to be "structural" or "true" if past experience, i.e. what state the individual was observed in the previous period, has a real effect on the probability of observing the individual in a given current state. According to this definition, past experience has an actual behavioral effect. However, the observed serial persistence may alternatively be due to time invariant, and unobservable, differences across individuals.
Under this assumption, the state dependence is termed "spurious" since the persistence is not due to the previous experience of an event.
The notion that previous participation directly affects current probability of participation is consistent with the concept of a "welfare trap" and can consequently be labeled structural, or true, state dependence. Possible explanations for the existence of a welfare trap are human capital depreciation, (in which the stock of human capital is depreciated during the period an individual is not active in the work force) or signaling (potential employers believe that a person who has been unemployed or on welfare is not as productive as an identical applicant who has not experienced these events). In either of these cases, wage offers are lowered by participation in the social assistance program and hence, the labor supply decision is affected, holding preferences constant. However, preferences themselves, and consequently the reservation wage, may be affected by participation in a welfare or unemployment compensation program. Nonetheless, if state dependence is structural, policies aimed to reduce participation in social assistance through changes in benefit rules are likely to reduce participation. The main mechanism to lower welfare dependence is through lower entry rates into the program, but exit probabilities are also likely to be affected.
The relationship between observed past and current states may instead be due to time invariant individual heterogeneity, and hence termed spurious. Clearly, some of the differences across individuals are due to observable characteristics, such as age, nativity, education, marital status and number of children, and can easily be controlled for in a model estimating these state propensities. The empirical methodology applied here also allows us to purge the data from time invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity and hence gives us an estimate of spurious state dependence. An important point is that the source is unobserved and permanent, at least in the sense of spanning the whole period analyzed. Potential explanations for the source of spurious state dependence are labor market discrimination and differences in time invariant preferences (with respect to leisure and/or so-called stigma effects associated with participation in the transfer program). 15 Although our empirical approach does not allow us to separate between these two potential sources, the results presented below will allow us to assess how these two distinct explanations contribute differently to the observed state dependence for immigrants and natives.
Model and Empirical Specification
To analyze transitions into and out of different labor market states, we estimate a dynamic multinomial logit model with random effects. We assume that the dynamic structure can be approximated by a first-order Markov model. The usage of longitudinal data allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity and to distinguish between "structural" and "spurious" state dependence. (2000), any probability structure of discrete choices can be captured using Type I extreme value errors in combination with a non-parametric specification of the unobserved heterogeneity, such as the one used in this paper. That is, the Type I extreme value distribution assumption by itself is not restrictive. 
During estimation, we allow imk η and imk α to be flexibly correlated and this relaxes the assumption that the initial conditions are exogenous. The likelihood contribution for individual i, with observed states k 1 , k 2 ,…,k T , given observed characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity, can be written as:
17 A simple and naïve approach would be to assume that the initial conditions are exogenous (uncorrelated with the unobserved individual-specific effects). However, this is a very strong assumption and unlikely to hold. Alternatively, we could assume that the stochastic process that generates the observed participation sequences is in equilibrium at the beginning of the sample period (see Card and Sullivan, 1988) . As pointed out by Chay and Hyslop, 1998 , this assumption is unlikely to hold when the observable covariates are timevarying and important determinants of participation. Finally, the random effects assumption could be relaxed in favor of a fixed effects estimator. In this framework, the unobserved individual-specific effects can be absorbed with a conditioning statement which would circumvent the initial conditions problem (see Arellano and Honore, 2000, and Kyriazidou, 2000) . However, in dynamic models with observable characteristics, the necessary conditioning statement is somewhat restrictive as it requires However, as imk η and imk α are not observed, we have to integrate out these terms from the above likelihood to obtain the unconditional likelihood function. To do this, we follow Heckman and Singer (1984) , and assume that the probability distribution of imk η and imk α can be approximated by a discrete distribution with a finite number (J) of support points. In this case, integration is replaced by a summation over the number of supports. Associated with each support point is a probability mass, j π , where 
Finally, we estimate and select J for each immigrant group using the Akaike Information Criteria. 
Empirical Results
In this section, we report results from maximizing the likelihood function above.
The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients provide little information about the size of the effects of the observable characteristics, due to the non-linear nature of the model. Therefore, instead of discussing the coefficient estimates, which are reported in Tables   A2-A5 in the Appendix, we will focus our presentation on the transition probabilities and source of observed state dependence. The predicted transition probabilities are derived by exogenous characteristics to be stationary in the final two periods. This implies, among other things, that time dummies and local labor market conditions are ruled out. 18 Instead of using a dynamic multinomial logit model, we could have estimated a discrete-time competing risks model with correlation across the risks. The left censoring problem that exists in the data could have been addressed by specifying distributions for the initial observations similar to what we do above. However, such a competing risks model implies estimating about 50% more parameters than in the dynamic multinomial logit model (in which we have over 100 parameters for each immigrant group).
first predicting each individual's probability, based on the estimates reported in Tables   A2-A5 , and secondly compute the average of these predicted probabilities separately for each of the four groups.
In Table 5 we present the predicted transition matrices separately for natives, Nordic immigrants, non-refugee immigrants and refugee immigrants. The entries in the top panel (Panel A) refer to a restricted specification that ignores the issue of unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous initial conditions (presented as Model 1 in Tables A2-A5 ).
In the lower panel of Table 6 (Panel B), we present results based on estimates from a general model that attempts to control for these matters (presented as Model 2 in Tables   A2-A5 ).
The entries in Panel A show that natives display lower state dependence in welfare than immigrants. The table also indicates smaller differences across groups in unemployment persistence. Moreover, the lower welfare participation rates among natives compared to immigrants, as shown in Table 1 , are due to both lower inflow rates and higher outflow rates. As expected, when controls for endogenous initial conditions and unobserved heterogeneity are incorporated in the model, we find a substantial reduction in the estimated state dependences for all groups. 19 The estimated decline in welfare persistence moving from Panel A to Panel B is greatest for natives. The probability that a native will remain in the welfare state in two consecutive years decreased from 0.58 in Model 1 to approximately 0.1 in Model 2. For immigrants from refugee countries, the probability of collecting welfare in two consecutive years changes from about 0.79 to about 0.63 when initial conditions and unobserved heterogeneity are controlled for. There are also large differences in the estimated unemployment state stability between immigrants and natives in Panel A and B. We next turn to examining these changes.
The transition probabilities reported in Table 5 can be used to decompose the estimated state dependence into structural and spurious state dependence. 20 The results 19 A similar reduction in serial persistence when controls for endogenous initial conditions and unobserved heterogeneity are incorporated is reported in Chay and Hyslop (1998) . Furthermore, we find that controls for both unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions contribute the reduction in state dependence but it appears to be mainly driven by the control for endogenous initial conditions. 20 We define structural state dependence as the ratio of the persistence probabilities with and without controls for unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions. from this decomposition are presented in Table 6 . For natives, we find that approximately 17 percent of the observed welfare persistence is "structural" and hence 83 percent is "spurious" and due to unobserved heterogeneity. Our results indicate relatively similar degrees of structural state dependence in welfare among Nordic and non-refugee immigrants. For both of these immigrant groups, as with natives, the majority of welfare state dependence can be labeled "spurious", approximately 70 and 60 percent respectively. This suggests that the majority of the observed serial persistence among
Nordic and non-refugee immigrants is also due to time invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The sources of state dependence in welfare are quite different for immigrants from refugee countries. Our estimates indicate that approximately 80 percent of the observed state dependence is structural and consequently only 20 percent of the welfare persistence is "spurious". These results are essential in analyzing the issue of a "welfare trap". Our findings indicate that such a trap does exist and that it is largest for refugee immigrants and smallest for natives. The reported standard errors, obtained using a parametric bootstrap, imply that the differences in structural versus spurious state dependence are significant at conventional levels of significance. We will now turn to a discussion of plausible reasons for the differences.
The finding that welfare dependence among natives is mostly spurious, while it is mostly structural among refugee immigrants, suggests two possible explanations; labor market discrimination and differences in preferences. This appears to imply that native welfare recipients have stronger preferences for welfare participation than refugee recipients, since it is hard to argue that native born Swedes would face more discrimination than refugee immigrants. One implication of this is that a change in the welfare benefit structure is not likely to lower participation as significantly among natives as among refugees. It also indicates that immigrants from refugee countries may be more susceptible to changes in the welfare programs and in work opportunities. Consistent with the findings of Andrén and Gustafsson (2004) , this suggests that policies directed at getting people off welfare, such as training programs, are more likely to be successful among the refugee population than among the native population.
The results also help explain why we observe higher welfare participation rates among refugee immigrants than other groups, even after several years in the country (Hansen and Lofstrom, 2003) . The current policy in Sweden implies a division of the integration process of refugee immigrants into two periods. Before integration into the labor market starts, an introductory period takes place in which the immigrant participates in Swedish language courses. During this period, refugees are introduced and supported by welfare. Given the finding that the observed state dependence among refugees is mainly structural (i.e. the probability of welfare receipt in the previous period directly affects current welfare participation) and the policy of initial support of refugees through welfare, we would expect higher welfare participation for a period of time.
It may be the case that some of the difference in welfare utilization and serial persistence in welfare use between natives and, in particular, refugee immigrants is due to differences in observed characteristics. For example, in the data we find that immigrants in Sweden are less likely to be high school graduates and slightly more likely to have a university degree than natives. Thus, a larger fraction of immigrants than natives has less than a high school degree. To test if this difference, as well as differences in other characteristics, can explain the difference in welfare utilization and serial persistence in welfare use, we calculated predicted transition matrices for all immigrants groups using the mean characteristics of the native population. The results are presented in Table 7 and show that differences in observed characteristics can explain only a very small fraction of the observed difference in welfare use. The fraction of the welfare state dependence that is attributed to structural reasons remains largely unchanged for the non-refugee and Nordic immigrant groups but declines by approximately 5 percent for refugee immigrants. This suggests that the differences in welfare use between natives and immigrants are mainly due to differences in unobserved characteristics, including differences in labor market preferences.
In an attempt to explore the robustness of our results, we re-estimated the two models presented above, with and without controls for unobserved heterogeneity, using an alternative approach to defining the labor market and welfare states. In the above analysis, a person belongs to the welfare state if he received social assistance for at least one month during the year, even if the person also received income from work. This definition is arguably ad-hoc, and to verify that our results and conclusions are not driven by our method of defining the three welfare and labor market states, we estimated models where an individual is firstly defined as employed if he earns at least the "basic" amount of 36, 200 Swedish kronor, regardless of receiving income from social assistance or unemployment insurance. In this alternative approach, we defined a person to be unemployed in a year if he received at least ½ of the "basic" amount in either UA or UB and was not defined to be employed. Lastly, a person is defined to be on welfare in a given year if he received welfare during the year while at the same time not satisfying the conditions for being defined to be employed or unemployed. In other words, we reversed the order in which we define the labor market or welfare state for the individual.
Moreover, from the results above we see that refugees are significantly different from natives and other immigrant groups in their labor market behavior. As a considerable fraction of refugee immigrants arrived in Sweden in the 1990s, our results may, to some extent, be determined by the composition of our refugee sample. To test this, we reestimated the models above on a sub-sample that excludes all refugee immigrants that arrived in Sweden during the 1990s.
The results from the sensitivity analysis are found in Tables 8 and 9 . These tables show the proportion of state dependence that is attributed to structural and spurious reasons. When we use the alternative "reverse" state definitions, see Table 8 , we find that the proportions of the state dependence in welfare that are structural decrease substantially for all four groups but, importantly, the relative relationship is the same as to what we report in Table 6 . The majority of state dependence in welfare among immigrants from refugee countries is still estimated to be structural while it is clearly spurious for natives, Nordic immigrants and immigrants from non-refugee countries.
Using the sub-sample that excludes all refugee immigrants who arrived in Sweden during the 1990's, shown in Table 9 , we find that the proportion of the state dependence in welfare that is spurious among refugee immigrants is somewhat lower but very similar to that reported in Table 6 . Thus, it appears that the result of a significantly larger structural state dependence and existence of a welfare trap among refugee immigrants is not due to a compositional change in the immigrant population stemming from the large inflow of refugee immigrants in the 1990's. Overall, our results appear quite robust towards how we define the labor market states and they also appear to be insensitive towards the composition of our refugee sample. 21 Furthermore, the results presented here are consistent with Hansen and Lofstrom (2006) who analyze differences between immigrants and natives in welfare entry and exits. Importantly, they investigate several other specifications of a dynamic welfare model, including dynamic fixed effects and correlated random effects specifications, and find that results on welfare persistence were similar across these alternative model specifications.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper analyzes transitions into and out of 3 different labor market states, social assistance, unemployment and employment, in Sweden. We use data from a large representative Swedish panel data set, LINDA, for the years 1990 to 1996, to investigate if there are differences in transition probabilities between immigrants and natives. The unadjusted data indicates that immigrants are more likely to receive both social assistance and unemployment compensation than natives are. Furthermore, immigrants appear to be less likely to remain employed in consecutive years than natives and more likely to stay on welfare and to receive unemployment insurance in a year, given participation in the previous year. The raw data also suggest that immigrants have a more difficult time moving into employment than natives. We find evidence of substantial differences between immigrants from refugee countries and natives, but smaller differences between non-refugee and Nordic immigrants and natives. Also, there seem to be relatively small differences between non-refugee immigrants and Nordic immigrants in terms of both transfer program participation and changes across welfare and labor market states.
Central to the welfare debate is the issue of an existence of a "welfare trap". If welfare utilization has an addictive effect, and current program participation directly impacts future probability of program utilization, high participation rates may be, at least partially, remedied by changes in welfare program parameters, including benefit levels.
The success of welfare reform is more questionable if instead observed serial persistence is due to "spurious" state dependence. In this case, permanent unobserved heterogeneity across individuals is the source of the state dependence. To separate between these sources of state dependence we estimate several dynamic multinomial logit models, including a model that controls for both endogenous initial condition and unobserved heterogeneity. The models also allows us to investigate differences in state dependence between immigrants and natives.
The empirical results suggest that immigrants display a greater degree of state dependence than natives. Furthermore, transfer program participation persistence appears to be less among immigrants from Nordic and non-refugee countries than among other immigrants. Our results also indicate that the source of the state dependence differ across immigrants and natives. In particular, refugee immigrant welfare utilization persistence stems to a greater extent from the "addictive" incentive effects of welfare participation, or the existence of a "welfare trap", than it does among natives. Consequently, state
dependence among natives appears to be due to unobserved heterogeneity, possibly in welfare preferences, to a greater extent than it is among immigrants from refugee countries. This implies that the composition of the immigrant and the native welfare population is different. A possible explanation for the differences across groups, particularly the welfare state dependence differences between refugee immigrants and the other nativity groups, is the country selection process is different for refugees. It is quite likely that refugee immigrants have not had the comfort of choosing their new country based on specific source country characteristics such as welfare programs.
These results suggest that changes in government transfer program eligibility levels and rules will have differential effects on immigrants and natives. Programs aimed at assisting labor market entry or re-entry are more likely to be successful among the refugee immigrant population than among the native population. The results also imply that changes in the welfare program, such as a lowering of benefits levels, are likely to reduce participation to a greater extent among immigrants from refugee countries than among natives. Table A1 . Standard errors, reported in brackets, are computed using the parametric bootstrap. We obtain 1000 draws from the asymptotic distribution of the maximum likelihood parameters and evaluate the transition probabilities for each draw. Standard errors are computed as the standard deviation of the simulated values of the transition probabilities. The number of individuals in each group is the same as the ones reported in Table 1 . Table 6 . Standard errors are computed using the parametric bootstrap. We obtain 1000 draws from the asymptotic distribution of the maximum likelihood parameters and evaluate the structural state dependence for each draw. Standard errors are computed as the standard deviation of the simulated values of the state dependence. The number of individuals in each group is the same as the ones reported in Table 1 . 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
